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There is a massive literature--and a whole section of the American Political Science 
Association--devoted to the study of political party systems. Such work seeks to explain why 
parties and larger party systems take different forms at different times and places and explores 
the implications for everything from economic performance to the quality of representation. Yet 
there is strikingly little work devoted to the basic question that underlies this research: Why do 
we have party systems at all? That is, what is it that causes political systems to become organized 
at least in part as party systems? In democracies, parties are virtually ubiquitous and thus the 
very fact that political competition is organized as party competition tends to be taken for 
granted rather than rigorously explained. In autocracies, parties are not ubiquitous, but more 
attention has been paid to the effects of ruling parties than to why such regimes wind up with 
ruling parties in the first place--the exception, of course, being a large number of studies of 
individual parties’ histories (such as the history of the CPSU) that are not seeking to contribute to 
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the larger question of “why parties at all?”2 Because theorists generally regard democracy as 
“unthinkable” without parties (Schattschneider 1942), and because research has indicated that 
parties are also important sources of authoritarian strength (e.g., Geddes 1999; Huntington 1966) 
there is strong a likelihood that the question of “why parties” in democracies is linked to the 
question of why democracies might fail as well as to the further questions of “why parties” in 
autocracies and why autocracies might fail. 
Despite the fact that “why parties” is thus a very big question of cross-national scope, it 
turns out that micro-level research that utilizes subnational variation has much to offer in 
answering it. This paper seeks to illustrate how this is the case through a focused comparison of 
survey results on district parliamentary elections in two Russian regions, Riazan’ and Krasnodar 
during 2003, the last year such elections were held in Russia. More specifically, it takes 
advantage of the fact that in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia had just emerged from a single-
party system and featured an electoral landscape that pitted party-affiliated candidates against 
nonparty candidates. This gives us the rare opportunity to use survey data to compare how 
partisan and nonpartisan candidates were able to connect with the electorate during a campaign 
during a crucial period of transition from totalitarian rule when it was not yet clear whether or 
how parties would ultimately dominate the new system that was emerging. This comparison, in 
turn, allows us to test the widespread assumption (treated here as a hypothesis) that party systems 
emerge because parties generally and systematically provide better connections between voters 
and candidates for office. By comparing results in two regions, we are able to gain greater 
leverage on the generality of the findings while holding constant other potentially confounding 
factors. 
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The results suggest that that party-nominated candidates indeed enjoy an advantage over 
nonparty candidates, but that this advantage is rather slight due to the presence of alternative 
sources of support (party substitutes) that the comparative literature does not adequately address. 
Moreover, it is found that the partisan advantage is not present in all the areas that the 
comparative literature leads us to expect. These findings also hold in both highly authoritarian 
and relatively democratic regions. While these findings must be treated as only a first step and 
should be replicated and elaborated in future studies, they provide some of the first systematic 
evidence (evidence including the necessary control variables provided by the presence of 
nonparty candidates) that parties do provide certain advantages. But the weakness of these 
advantages (weakness that is established to exist at least in the context of one country, Russia) 
should lead us to question whether they are really the most important determinant of whether a 
political system becomes a party system. 
Indeed, a look at the larger picture of Russian developments suggest that these 
advantages are too weak in and of themselves to make the conversion of a political system into a 
party system inevitable. Instead, what we seem to find in Russia’s single-member-district 
parliamentary elections is a something like a series of matches between parties and “party 
substitutes” that does not clearly establish the dominance of one side over the other. This leaves 
the door open for direct state intervention to drive developments in the party system, determining 
not only how but whether parties develop. In Russia, this has meant a complex process whereby 
the state has forced party development in some parts of the political system (as by mandating that 
only party lists can compete for national parliamentary seats and by coordinating various party 
substitutes to form the new pro-incumbent United Russia Party) while it has kept parties at arms 
length in others (as by keeping even United Russia out of the presidency itself and not allowing 
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true party control over government formation). The fact that natively developing parties were 
unable to establish their own early authority among the electorate meant that they were unable to 
resist, resulting in a highly lopsided and incomplete party system that has facilitated Russia’s 
further movement away from ideals of democratic electoral competition. Patterns of state 
developments, much more than inherent advantages parties have over nonparty forms of political 
organization, are thus likely to be a more fundamental explanation as to why and how party 
systems develop and shape regime dynamics after periods of non-party or one-party dictatorship. 
 
The Puzzle: How and Why Do Political Systems Become Party Systems? 
 A political party, building on Sartori (1976: 58-64) and Schattschneider (1970: 35-7), is 
here defined as an enduring association of people who identify themselves by a public label and 
are joined together under it for the primary purpose of winning control of the national 
government by means of presenting their own candidates in elections for public office on the 
basis of a common platform (Hale 2006).
3
 When law stipulates that only parties can participate 
in a given set of elections, of course, we are justified in taking parties as givens. But most large 
countries with competitive elections, states as diverse as the United States, India, and 
contemporary Russia, do not mandate full party monopolies in the polity. There, it is germane to 
wonder how, if at all, sets of parties (as opposed to independents or nonparty forms of political 
organization) come to monopolize the political “market.” 
Democracies without mandated party monopolies have typically experienced a phase of 
partial party penetration early in their democratic histories and passed through it fairly quickly. 
The American founding fathers initially believed that parties were an evil and took a while to 
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reconcile themselves to their utility in political struggles (Hofstadter 1970). As late as the 1820s, 
after the Federalist Party had entered political oblivion and the Jeffersonian Republican Party 
had effectively dissolved in the wake of President James Monroe’s retirement, U.S. politics was 
largely dominated by state- and city-level machines quite autonomous of any national party 
(Aldrich 1995; McCormick 1966; Remini 1959). India experienced a like period before the 
Congress Party established itself as a full-fledged country-wide party (Weiner 1967). In both 
places, though, parties soon came to dominate national politics, with the Democrats, the Whigs, 
and then the Republicans coming to the fore in the United States and Congress establishing 
hegemony in India. 
The few scholarly works that have sought a general answer to the “why parties” question 
advance a number of theories. The most prominent explanation for the grip parties acquire on the 
political market in democracies seeks to elaborate on the reasons behind the widespread belief 
that democracy is unworkable in their absence. As Aldrich (1995) argues, most theories of party 
emergence come down to pleading parties’ usefulness in resolving two generic problems. One is 
the social choice problem faced by legislators: ad hoc minimal majorities could pass any number 
of bills on almost any issue where there is latitude for tradeoffs, but parties stabilize coalitions, 
so that legislators do not continually make successful counter-proposals to existing agreements 
and trap themselves in a futile “cycling” pattern. The second is the collective action problem 
whereby candidates for office have to muster the active support of a huge quantity of individual 
citizens in order to win an election. 
In tracing how these benefits are originally orchestrated, classic works on parties 
discriminate between “internal” and “external” paths (Duverger 1954; Shefter 1977, 1994). In 
internal party formation, nonpartisan legislators find it in their interest to form a lasting coalition 
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(solving the social choice problem) and then bolster it by mobilizing the electorate through 
grassroots organization (solving the collective action problem).
4
 In external party creation, 
outsiders to the legislature take up the collective action conundrum first and move from elections 
to gaining entry into parliament or government. Party candidates, so the reigning school of 
thought holds, eventually become the only viable ones because they have an insuperable 
advantage either in delivering legislative goods or in garnering popular votes. The logic is said 
with few exceptions to force even reluctant party builders to follow suit, as Hofstadter’s (1970) 
memorable study of the American case makes clear. Leading theorists have taken the assumption 
of the near-inevitability of parties so much to heart that they portray party formation as a 
relatively smooth process of absorbing or eclipsing alternative forms (Duverger 1954; Hofstadter 
1970; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Ostrogorski 1902; 
Panebianco 1988; Sartori 1976; Schattschneider 1942). 
Others, to be sure, see party building as a rather more problematic sequence and leave 
room in their explanations for the opportunistic harnessing of circumstances, though they rarely 
seriously consider the possibility that the system could have developed without parties 
altogether. These accounts depict processes by which parties mobilize state resources to 
outcompete other groups (Weiner 1967; Ware 2000), build on legacies from the pre-democratic 
period (Coleman and Rosberg 1964: 664), or otherwise absorb or outmuscle other forms of 
organization once political competition compels them to do so (Aldrich 1995; Rokkan 1970; 
Shefter 1977, 1994). The literature also contains a dissident strain that testifies to a “decline of 
parties” in Western democracies even today.5 The authors in this camp are to varying degrees 
skeptical of traditional claims of party indispensability, but this literature is mostly about shifts in 
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the importance, coherence, issue orientation, and representational quality of parties and not about 
their outright extinction, to say nothing of their failure to crop up in newly democratized 
societies. Thus, for example, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987: 9) find that, despite the growth 
in importance of candidates personal resources relative to party support in the United States, “the 
single most important variable affecting the congressional vote remains the voter’s partisan 
identification.” Anckar and Anckar (2000) declare iconoclastically that democracies generally 
can function without parties, but illustrate only from island microstates and do not formulate 
what, if anything, would replace parties.
6
 
Whether one buys into the strong or the weak version of the argument, the comparative 
literature on the rise of parties in emerging democracies boils down to a claim that parties offer 
office seekers one or more of three tangible benefits.  
1. The first is a capacious organization that will grant candidates support in 
communicating with and rallying supporters and money to subsidize their campaigns. 
2. No less basic is a second benefit, provision of what political scientists, borrowing 
from the lexicon of commercial marketing, have termed a party brand name. A 
partisan brand conveys valuable information on candidates’ likely future stands, 
fosters and evokes party loyalties, ties candidates in voters’ minds to other powerful 
politicians, and/or signals that a candidate has wide social support (Aldrich 1995; 
Snyder and Ting 2002). A major-party label can bestow on a candidate the focal 
status of “contender” and eliminate citizens’ fear of wasting a vote on someone who 
has no significant chance of winning (Cox 1997). 
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3. The third advantage is thought to turn up relative to legislative or policy outputs. 
Even were parties not to provide office seekers with organizational or branding help 
in overcoming the collective action problem in the electorate, they can still allay the 
social choice problem in the legislature (Aldrich 1995). Assuming that voters care 
about legislative outputs, party candidates reap an advantage because they are better 
positioned to “deliver the goods” voters want than are candidates who will insist on 
independence in the legislature. 
This general theory that party systems emerge because parties provide candidates with 
these three types of benefits is highly plausible. It is also backed by considerable evidence that 
parties do in fact provide organization, branding, and outputs. But there is a big problem for 
anyone seeking to make the leap between this observation and the claim that it answers the “why 
parties” question: Parties are not the world’s only sources of organization, branding, and 
outputs (Hale 2006). Indeed, not only can non-party forms of organization in principle provide 
these things (for example, firms), individual candidates (again, in principle) can also do so by 
themselves through purely personal networks, energy, or charisma. But if non-party forms of 
organization or even individual candidates can provide these things, why should parties’ ability 
also to provide them be expected to lead to the near universal dominance of parties in 
democracies? The answer must be a relative claim: parties’ ability to provide these things can 
explain parties’ dominance only if there is reason to expect parties to be able to provide these 
things better, more reliably, more consistently, or in greater measure than can individual 
candidates or non-party forms of organization. 
Yet strikingly, this relative claim has almost never been tested empirically. There are 
several dimensions to this problem. For one thing, even when theoretical ideas are developed and 
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even when the further step of empirical analysis is undertaken, they typically ignore independent 
candidates, failing actually to test whether independents (whether completely autonomous or 
backed by other forms of political organization) are actually any less able to achieve 
organization, branding, and outputs than party candidates. For another, such studies 
overwhelmingly neglect the need to consider cases of party development together with cases 
where parties failed to monopolize the political system. This creates a problem of selection bias, 
since only success cases are considered. The most authoritative accounts of party-system origins 
do, of course, compare party-dominated countries with their own non-party pasts (e.g., Aldrich 
1995), but since they are only looking at the set of countries where parties did go on to dominate 
the political system, the problem of selection bias remains: A case where parties provided the 
three benefits outlined above but failed to dominate the political system would falsify the 
argument, but such cases are not considered. 
A defender of current studies might rejoin with the observation that virtually all 
democracies are dominated by political parties. The number of democracies without parties is a 
null set outside island micro-states (Anckar and Anckar 2000), so it might reasonably be argued 
that control cases are impossible and that their very empirical absence is itself evidence for the 
theory. The problem here is that virtually all major theorists of parties have also written 
something else: Democracy is “unworkable” (Aldrich 1995)  or “unimaginable” (Weber 1946) 
without parties and parties are “indispensable” (Lipset 1959, 2000) for democracy. One 
reasonable interpretation of this claim is that countries that fail to develop parties should also fail 
to develop democracies. The negative cases that constitute the set of crucial controls, then, are 
likely to be found in nondemocratic regimes, or at least highly imperfect or hybrid regimes. Thus 
only to study party system development in countries that ultimately became democracies with 
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developed party systems constitutes a very serious form of selection bias that can potentially 
blind us to the most important answer to the big question of “why parties.” Unfortunately, 
scholars seeking to understand why we have party systems almost never look to non-
democracies precisely because parties in authoritarian or hybrid regimes do not play a major role 
in how a country is governed and because it is widely thought that authoritarian contexts 
fundamentally alter the role of parties, making the comparison with democratic parties 
inappropriate. 
Some scholars do pay attention to parties in nondemocratic contexts, of course. In 
particular, over the past dozen years, a group of scholars has rediscovered Huntington’s (1966) 
insight that parties are crucial not only for the functioning of democracies but also for 
autocracies. These scholars have observed, in particular, that strong ruling parties tend to 
promote authoritarian stability and longevity (e.g., Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999). Such works, 
however, tend to treat strong parties as either an exogenous factor that happens to come into play 
or simply as a strategy of authoritarian rule that dominant elites or leaders choose. For example, 
Levitsky and Way (2010) note the role of parties in strengthening “competitive authoritarian” 
regimes but only cursorily trace this party strength to party bases in ethnic ties or 
revolutionary/independence struggles. Moreover, they do not take the additional step (crucial to 
answer the “why parties” question) of considering why ethnic cleavages might manifest 
themselves in party form as opposed to some other form, or why revolutionary struggle might 
take on a partisan character as opposed to some other organizational character. Slater (2011) 
notes the importance of authoritarian party organization in providing stability, but sees party 
formation and other forms of authoritarian institution-building as outcomes of a “protection pact” 
that elites forge to secure their positions against class rivals or other broad-based political 
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opponents. He does not, however, seek to explain variation in when pacts result in parties and 
when they result in other institutional arrangements. These theories, then, are primarily theories 
of party strength and do not adequately address the more fundamental why parties question. And 
the literature on authoritarian parties is almost entirely on ruling parties in any case.
7
 And 
moreover, the findings from these studies of authoritarian parties are essentially never (at least, 
to my knowledge) mobilized to answer the question of “why parties” in democracies. 
Overall, we are left without convincing empirical substantiation of two levels of 
important claims (here treated as hypotheses) that are central to the standard answer to the 
question of “why parties”: 
 Hypothesis No.1: Parties provide benefits to office-seekers better than individuals or 
non-party forms of organization. Lower level hypotheses posit that these benefits 
specifically involve: (1.1) organization; (1.2) branding; and (1.3) outputs. 
 Hypothesis No.2: Any such party advantage actually explains why political systems 
become party systems. 
In two earlier publications (Hale 2005, 2006), the present author did seek explicitly to test these 
two hypotheses in the case of the Russian Federation, adding cause for concern. These studies 
showed that candidates backed by party substitutes (nonparty forms of political organization that 
provide at least some of the benefits parties are expected to provide candidates, in particular 
regional political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups) fairly consistently 
performed as well or better than did candidates backed by major political parties in legislative 
and executive elections at both the regional and national levels, contrary to Hypothesis 1. These 
studies moreover found little indication that candidates were increasingly turning to parties as 
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opposed to party substitutes, casting doubt on Hypothesis 2. While very suggestive, these studies 
could not disprove Hypothesis 1 (and hence Hypothesis 2) in part because they were based on 
election results and thus could not test directly whether the parties were any better or worse than 
party substitutes at providing the specific benefits specified in standard answers to the “why 
parties” question or whether entirely different factors were likely at work. We thus remain 
without direct tests of Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. 
 
The Methodological Advantages of District Election Survey Research in Russia’s Regions 
This paper argues that survey research taking advantage of diversity in Russia’s regions 
presents a good opportunity to conduct the first direct tests of Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 for 
several reasons. 
 Russia represents a crucial case of a country that featured electoral competition but 
where parties have still not monopolized political competition even two decades after 
such competition was allowed and where, as would be expected, this failure by 
parties has been accompanied by movement away from rather than toward democratic 
ideals (Fish 2005, Moraski and Reisinger 2007). By adding a study of Russia to the 
comparative literature on why parties, then, we are remedying the major problem of 
selection bias that undermines our confidence in the established theoretical wisdom. 
 Related to this, Russia also represents a country where partisan and nonparty 
candidates have regularly competed against each other in hundreds of elections (Hale 
2006). This affords us the opportunity to directly test not only whether parties 
outperform nonparty alternatives, but to systematically explore what the source of any 
advantage or disadvantage is. 
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 Moreover, this party-nonparty electoral competition has taken place in a large number 
of territories that are highly diverse (Moraski and Reisinger 2003). This enables 
researchers not only to explore broad patterns in this diversity (Turovskii 2007), but 
also to identify territories for focused regional case comparisons that maximally 
isolate variables of interest and thus provide for the most compelling results 
(Sharafutdinova 2011). 
In the case of the “why parties” question, the fact of diverse Russian elections featuring 
partisan and nonparty candidates allows us to select two territories for a carefully controlled 
“paired comparison” (Tarrow 2010) that tests Hypotheses 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 and contributes to our 
evaluation of the plausibility of Hypothesis 2. Since the components of Hypothesis 1 are about 
whether parties do in fact provide benefits to candidates that candidates cannot get from nonparty 
sources, the chosen strategy is to survey the electorate of two district parliamentary elections. 
This sheds detailed light on exactly how partisan and nonparty candidates are (or are not) 
connecting with individual voters and facilitates a judgment as to whether there is a systematic 
difference. While a national-level survey could also shed light on this question, the specific mix 
of parties and party substitutes and the number of candidates varies quite widely across districts 
(even in a single election cycle), seriously complicating the effort to obtain meaningful results. 
The survey was conducted as part of the Russian Election Studies (RES) series together 
with Timothy Colton. Specifically, it was a representative survey of voters in two single-
member-district Russian State Duma elections in two different subjects of the Russian 
Federation. The surveys were carried out right after the elections of December 7, 2003, the last 
district-based Duma elections before Russia’s move to national parliamentary elections based 
entirely on party-list competition. 
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The two districts were selected in order to obtain a comparable set of choices faced by 
district voters (no small task, as it turns out), to control for as many factors that might complicate 
interpretation of the findings of interest, and to obtain variation in the degree to which a district 
election was held in a democratic or authoritarian environment. Thus first, we sought districts 
that were similar in: (a) featuring nominees from a nearly “full set” of major parties, including at 
least the pro-government United Russia, the opposition Communist Party, and one of the 
opposition liberal parties (Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces); (b) featuring at least one 
significant independent candidate; (c) containing both urban and rural populations in significant 
measure; and (d) being part of ordinary regions as opposed to ethnically designated territories. 
Criteria (a) and (b) ensured that the districts enable us to study what we want to study, 
differences between partisan and independent candidates. Criterion (c) means that we can check 
to see whether our results are merely an artifact of urbanization, and criterion (d) controls for the 
potentially complicating effects of ethnic politics.
8
 
While we wanted our two districts to be similar in the above ways, we also sought 
districts that varied greatly on one factor that is widely thought to have a major impact on the 
role of parties but that is also thought to reflect patterns of party development: the general level 
of “democracy” in a region. Here we relied on the expert assessment of one of Russia’s own 
premier analysts of regional politics, Nikolay Petrov, and his team of analysts, who produced a 
series of ratings of levels of democracy in the provinces, measuring essentially the degree of 
dominance of the local governor’s political machine.9 By studying districts in both relatively 
democratic and relatively autocratic contexts, we will gain better leverage over how or whether 
political contestation affects the hypothesized advantages of political parties for candidates, and 
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this in turn helps us address concerns that studying the “autocratizing” Russia might not be 
appropriate for drawing conclusions about why democracies almost always feature party 
systems. The present study, therefore, not only combines behavioral survey research with a 
paired comparison approach, but it also uses the paired comparison both to hold a series of 
regional-level factors constant (as in most-similar-systems comparisons) and to provide variation 
in one regional-level factor of particular interest (as in most-different-systems comparisons) 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). 
The choice of districts was made about two weeks prior to the election. While not many 
districts met all our criteria, we ultimately selected District No. 46 in the Krasnodar region and 
District No. 149 in the Riazan’ region. Henceforth I often refer just to the “Krasnodar district” 
and the “Riazan’ district,” but this should be understood as relating specifically to districts 46 
and 149 as they existed in 2003; both Krasnodar and Riazan’ also contained other districts that 
are not discussed here but that may differ from those we examine. These districts and the races 
they featured will be briefly described below.  
The surveys involved sample sizes of approximately one thousand voting-age citizens 
each (to be exact, 1,041 respondents in Krasnodar and 1,044 in Riazan’). Respondents were 
selected through the multistage area probability method and can be taken as representative of the 
populations of the two districts. Survey interviews were done between late December 2003 and 
mid-February 2004. The fieldwork and data entry were managed by the Demoscope survey 
group led by sociologists at the Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences, Moscow. We put 
these surveys in context through a general reading of published material on the national Duma 
campaign and analytical reports written on the campaigns in each of these districts by leading 
local experts (Natalia Kolba in Krasnodar and Vladimir Avdonin in Riazan’), commissioned by 




In the pages that follow, I briefly describe the two district races, framing them in the 
larger Duma campaign, and then compare independent and party-nominated candidates in their 
capacities to do what parties are posited to help them do. 
 
The 2003 Duma District Races in Krasnodar 46 and Riazan’ 149 
In the mixed electoral system that Russia featured prior to the 2007 parliamentary 
election, 225 seats in the Duma (the lower house of parliament) were elected through a 
proportional representation (PR) system and the remaining 225 were elected in single-member 
districts (SMDs). The most prominent feature of the 2003 district races for the Duma was the 
Kremlin’s unprecedentedly strong effort to coordinate candidacies in its favor. In the previous 
Duma elections, in December 1999, nominees of the pro-government Unity party,
11
 which was 
organized in haste less than three months before the campaign, had won just nine district races. 
Overall, Russia’s major parties won only 102 of the 224 district seats up for election that year, 
with the remainder going to either minor-party representatives or, more typically, independents 
backed by party substitutes, notably provincial political machines or major corporate 
conglomerates. Once elected president in March 2000, Vladimir Putin cobbled together a 
working Duma majority thanks to his great popularity and the massive resources Russia’s 
presidents wield (Hale and Orttung 2003). But his administration nevertheless saw advantage in 
producing a larger and more easily controlled Duma majority and so began very early in Putin’s 
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first term to push and cajole the provincial bosses and corporate “oligarchs” into coordinating 
their efforts around particular candidates sanctioned by the Kremlin. These candidates, in turn, 
were generally expected to run under the banner of the Unity party’s successor, the United 
Russia Party (Hale 2006; Reuter and Remington 2009; Smyth, Wilkening, and Urasova 2007). 
While the coordination was not fully successful, it did produce a much more “partisan” 
election and a much more partisan set of Duma deputies than had ever been the case before. 
Most of this party bounty naturally went to United Russia, whose nominees won 100 district 
seats outright in December 2003 and which then absorbed a large number of other candidates 
into its Duma coalition (“fraction”) after the election. When combined with the party-list results, 
in which United Russia won 38 percent of the vote, the pro-Kremlin party wound up with 306 
deputies in its fraction, or more than two-thirds of the total Duma. The two most prominent self-
professed “liberal” parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces (SPS), won just four and 
three district seats, respectively, and both failed to clear the five-percent hurdle necessary to win 
seats through the PR competition. The other major parties winning substantial numbers of seats 
for their district nominees were the Communist Party (KPRF), which scored just 12 victories 
after having boasted 46 wins in 1999, and the Motherland (Rodina) bloc, a new party that 




The campaigns in the present study’s two districts reflected these broad trends as well as 
much of the complexity that is Russian provincial politics. The southwestern Krasnodar District 
No. 46 combined one of Russia’s major port cities, Novorossiisk, with the highly rural area 
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1999 election and most of the 2003 winners were incumbents. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won 
11 percent of the PR vote but not a single district seat in 2003. See Hale 2006 for more details. 
  18 
around Tuapsinsk. The district’s major-party nominees in 2003 included: 
 Sergei Shishkarev, the incumbent, who had won his seat as an independent in 1999 but 
was now competing as a Motherland nominee; 
 Konstantin Shirshov, the Communist Party candidate; 
 Ilia Kochian, the United Russia nominee; 
 Aleksandr Belichenko, an LDPR candidate; and 
 Sergei Panchenko, a Yabloko representative. 
Equally important for our study is that the district also featured a prominent set of independent 
candidates who were widely regarded to be among the top contenders, notably: 
 Anatoly Vysochin, Deputy Tuapsinsk Mayor; 
 Nina Zatsepina, the leftist former Duma deputy whom Shishkarev had defeated in the 




 Mikhail Kovaliuk, a big businessman and provincial legislator backed by some major 
economic groups in Novorossiisk; and 
 Sergei Yaryshev, the security chief for the Novorossiisk port who was reported to be 
supported by Novorossiisk’s major port authority as well as the Krasnodar governor’s 
political machine.  
The presence of both Yaryshev and Kochian in the race illustrates that the Kremlin’s effort to 
coordinate the candidacies of pro-Putin candidates in Krasnodar was hindered by local 
                                                 
13
 This is the Otechestvo (“Fatherland”) Party, which had been the chief electoral vehicle of Krasnodar’s longtime 
governor, the powerful machine politician and leftist-nationalist Nikolai Kondratenko, who had left office a few 
years before the elections and handed power over to the current governor, Aleksandr Tkachev, who began to 
establish a somewhat independent power base. 
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complexities too elaborate to explain in this paper.
14
 Nikolay Petrov’s May 2003 assessments of 
regional democracy placed Krasnodar among Russia’s least democratic regions, ranking it 66th 
out of 89. 
Riazan’ District No. 149 primarily included a part of the city of Riazan’ as well as some 
of the surrounding rural territory and was located in Riazan’ Oblast, the 11th most democratic 
region of Russia according to Petrov’s May 2003 rankings. The race shaped up as follows: 
 Nadezhda Korneeva, a Communist Party member, was the incumbent and enjoyed the 
support of the province’s governor and important regional business interests; 
 Nikolai Bulaev of United Russia was her main opponent, and his party was suspected of 
having struck a deal with SPS for the latter to withdraw a popular candidate in a joint 
effort to defeat Korneeva. Bulaev had the strong support of the Riazan’ mayor’s 
administration as well as Kremlin authorities, who Avdonin reports were able to restrain 
the governor from applying the full force of his office to reelect Korneeva. 
 Yabloko, SPS, and the LDPR all nominated little-known candidates. 
The two party favorites in the race were joined by: 
 Igor Trubitsyn, an independent deputy in the regional legislature with strong support 
from local business. Trubitsyn was the director of the holding company Roskontrakt, 
which controlled a large number of businesses in the Dashkovo-Pesochnia territory of 
Riazan’ city, an area with roughly a fifth of the district’s registered voters. 
Two other strong independent challengers, who were never however expected to win, were: 
 Viktor Milekhin, a perennial candidate and former big businessman; and 
 Aleksei Mikhailov, a scandal-seeking Riazan’ city councilman and construction firm 
                                                 
14
 More information on this race is given in Henry E. Hale and Timothy J. Colton, “The Disappearing Duma 
Districts: A Look at What Russians Will Be Losing,” draft paper, April 2006, available from the authors. 
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director linked to a network of local retail and construction business structures. 
The results of the races are presented in Tables 1 and 2. As can be seen, the incumbent 
and Motherland nominee Shishkarev was victorious in Krasnodar, soundly beating the United 
Russia nominee (Kochian) and two independent rivals, both of whom were supported by 
significant local power structures. In Riazan’, United Russia was more successful: Its nominee 
Bulaev handily defeated the incumbent and Communist nominee Korneeva and the strongest 
independent challenger, Trubitsyn.  
Table 1: Results in Krasnodar 
Candidate Official Result Survey Result 
Shishkarev 19 29 
Yaryshev 14 12 
Kochian 11 9 
Zatsepina 9 9 
Shirshov 8 10 
Kovaliuk 8 8 
Vysochin 5 3 
Belichenko 3 1 
Panchenko 3 1 
Beloglazov 2 1 
Savchenko 1 1 
Kuznetsov 1 .3 
Sergeeva 1 1 
Gerasimov .3 0 
 
Table 2: Results in Riazan’ 
Candidate Official Result Survey Result 
Bulaev 31 40 
Korneeva 16 13 
Trubitsyn 11 8 
Sherin 5 5 
Tabolin 4 3 
Milekhin 4 2 
Dmitriev 2 1 
Mikhailov 2 1 
Viktorov 2 1 
Kprf 2 .1 
Potapov 2 1 
Sidorov 1 1 
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The tables also present the findings from the surveys. From the subset of respondents 
who said they voted, the second column in each table presents the percentage of respondents who 
claimed shortly after the election to have voted for the different candidates. Two things stand 
out. First, there is substantial overreporting of voting for the winner, a tendency common to 
survey analyses of voting behavior. More importantly, however, our estimates of the vote totals 
of all of the other candidates, in both districts, are highly accurate. This suggests that the 
overreporting of votes for the winners’ results primarily from non-voters claiming to have voted 
rather than from people inaccurately identifying whom they actually voted for.
15
 This helps us 
interpret patterns of support for the candidates. 
 
Parties vs. Party Substitutes in Krasnodar and Riazan’ 
We now undertake a simple comparison of the relationship between voters and district 
candidates, with an eye to learning more about the role parties play in this relationship by 
comparing party candidates with independents.
16
 To begin, it is helpful to ask voters directly 
whether they think their legislators tend to perform best when in parties. Since comparative 
theory posits that parties tend to develop because they help politicians obtain outputs that voters 
want, it is important to find out whether voters in fact see things this way. We thus queried 
respondents about three types of outputs that district legislators are posited by experts to provide: 
legislation for the benefit of the country as a whole (hereafter, just “legislation”), funds from the 
state budget for the benefit of the deputy’s particular district (labeled “pork” in the table that 
                                                 
15
 Additionally, we have confidence that the results are not distorted by fear on the part of respondents: Both 
winners, whose votes are overreported, actually had histories of opposition to local authorities and one winner 
(Shishkarev) was also not the favorite of the Kremlin, yet we see virtually the same pattern of overstated support for 
the winners. 
16
 The figures reported in this working paper reflect adjustment according to the Kish weighting procedure, designed 
to correct for certain sample distortions, such as the overrepresentation of retirees since they are most likely to be at 
home when the interviewer comes calling. 
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follows), and services that in the United States are typically referred to as “constituency service,” 
helping individual electors with concrete problems such as pensions, jobs, or military service. 
We do find that residents of our two regions value these different outputs. Asked which they 
thought should be the priority for their SMD deputies, pluralities in both Krasnodar and Riazan’ 
named constituency service (44 and 52 percent, respectively), while substantial numbers also 
named legislation (22 and 27 percent) and pork (20 and 17 percent).
17
 
Tables 3 and 4 report our findings when we asked respondents whether they thought their 
deputies could better provide each of these three goods by being a member of a party fraction in 
the Duma or by remaining independent.
18
 As can be seen, pluralities in every instance believed 
that deputies were more effective by working through parties in the parliament. At the same 
time, however, in no case was this a majority opinion: Roughly as many potential voters in both 
Riazan’ and Krasnodar believed either that parties make no difference or that legislators are 
actually better off spurning party fractions altogether. Thus while many voters do tend to 
perceive that parties make for better deputies, this finding is far from overwhelming. In any case, 
the stronger incentive for candidates looking to convince voters of their future effectiveness 
would seem to be to pledge party affiliation rather than to spurn it.
19
 
Table 3. Perceptions of Parties’ Importance for SMD Deputies in Providing Key Outputs: 
Krasnodar 
 In Party Fraction Outside Party Fraction No Difference Hard to Say 
Legislation 47 20 24 8 
Pork 40 24 25 10 
Constituency service 35 26 28 10 
 
                                                 
17
 Question 86, Okrug survey. 
18
 Question 82, Okrug survey. 
19
 We might also expect voters to distinguish among different types of parties here: Being affiliated with a majority 
party fraction might be expected to bring a deputy more influence than affiliation with a small opposition party. 
While this was beyond the scope of what was possible in our survey, this dynamic, if found, would reinforce the 
finding that the net incentive in terms of voter perceptions of the sources of “outputs” would be for candidates to 
join parties. 
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Table 4. Perceptions of Parties’ Importance for SMD Deputies in Providing Key Outputs: 
Riazan’ 
 In Party Fraction Outside Party Fraction No Difference Hard to Say 
Legislation 48 12 27 13 
Pork 42 11 29 17 
Constituency service 36 14 36 15 
 
Theories of party development also frequently cite the organizational capacities of parties 
as being a key to their spread: Candidates group together in parties so that they can pool 
resources or gain access to organization. These assets are said to help them win votes by 
connecting more effectively with the electorate. Our surveys contained a large series of questions 
designed to determine the degree to which prospective voters were contacted by district 
candidates as well as the particular forms in which this contacting took place. Contrary to 
sometimes held perceptions that Russians have little contact with their district candidates’ 
campaigns, we in fact find that the contacting was quite extensive and multifaceted in Krasnodar 
and Riazan’ in the 2003 SMD Duma races there. Table 5 presents some summary information to 
this effect. While only 8 percent of our respondents in the Krasnodar district and 3 percent in the 
Riazan’ district reported any direct contact with representatives of the candidates, large 
majorities in both places received at least one mailing or saw at least one leaflet or poster from 
an SMD candidate. Near-majorities in both localities witnessed candidates’ television advertising 
while 55 percent of surveyed Krasnodar district residents were exposed to candidates through 
newspapers (this figure was just 34 percent in the Riazan’ district, however). 








Newspapers TV ads 
Krasnodar 8 85 65 55 45 
Riazan’ 3 75 63 34 49 
                                                 
20
 Questions 97, 99, 102, 112, 116, Okrug survey. 
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Were party candidates, on the whole, noticeably more effective at reaching voters than 
were independent candidates in our two districts? To get at this question, Table 6 breaks down 
by candidate our data on different forms of contacting, grouping candidates not only by their 
district but also by whether or not they were nominated by parties. Within the four groups 
defined by the categories “party candidates/independents” and the two districts, candidates are 
listed in the order of the actual vote share that they won in their races (and that vote share is 
reported in the second column) so as to make clear to the reader which are the major and which 
are the minor candidates. 
If we focus on the very strongest independents and the very strongest partisans, the 
partisans do appear to have a slight but consistent advantage: The top party candidates did tend 
to reach a wider swath of voters than did the top nonparty candidates in the same districts. For 
example, the winner Shishkarev (Motherland) in Krasnodar managed to contact 65 percent of all 
district residents through mailings and over 40 percent through leaflets and newspapers, while 
the top-performing independent in the district (Yaryshev) reached at least 10 percent fewer 
potential voters on each count. A similar pattern was evident in Riazan’: the winner Bulaev 
(United Russia) contacted more voters than did the strongest nonpartisan (Trubitsyn) in every 
category, according to our survey.  This does not simply reflect incumbency, since Bulaev was 
not the incumbent in Riazan’.  Moreover, the local experts on these districts, Kolba (Krasnodar) 
and Avdonin (Riazan’), make clear in their on-the-ground analyses of the regions that parties did 
play important roles in these candidates’ campaigns. Kolba mentions in particular the television 
exposure that Shishkarev got through the Motherland party, and indeed a third of his district’s 
residents had seen at least one advertisement that featured him. The sharpest difference between 
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the top party candidates and the top party substitute candidates appears to have been in television 
advertising, with the top party candidates far outpacing even the strongest independents. 
At the same time, when we turn our attention away from Riazan’s Shishkarev, who had been an 
independent when he originally won the seat in 1999, the picture becomes cloudier. For one 
thing, within Riazan’, the top three independents were more than capable of generating at least as 
much voter contact as did any of Krasnodar’s partisans other than Shishkarev, including United 
Russia’s nominee, Kochian. The independent Yaryshev, in particular, stands out for reaching 
nearly half of all potential voters through his mailings and making his candidacy known through 
leaflets, newspapers, and television advertising more effectively than any of the other candidates 
in the district except Shishkarev. Importantly, the independents Zatsepina and Kovaliuk were not 
far behind, also reaching more people than did the second-most effective partisan. While 
Riazan’s nonpartisan candidates were, as a set, considered weaker to begin with by our local 
experts, Trubitsyn disseminated leaflets and posters in a manner on a par with the leading 
partisan (Bulaev of United Russia) and kept pace with the second strongest partisan contactor, 
the Communist incumbent Korneeva, in mailings and newspaper. The Riazan’ independent 
Milekhin, despite netting just 4 percent of the vote, also reached over 10 percent of the district’s 
voters in several categories of contacting, besting the representatives of all parties other than 
United Russia and the KPRF. Additionally, so few respondents were directly contacted by 
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Newspapers TV ads 
PARTY CANDIDATES       
Krasnodar       
Shishkarev (Rodina) (i)(w) 19 4 65 47 42 35 
Kochian (UR) 11 1 19 21 11 6 
Shirshov (KPRF) 8 1 14 10 5 3 
Belichenko (LDPR) 3 0 3 1 1 1 
Panchenko (Yabloko) 3 0 3 1 2 2 
Kuznetsov (PVR/RPZh) 1 0 1 .1 .4 1 
Gerasimov (Rus) .3 0 1 .5 .4 .3 
Riazan’       
Bulaev (ER) (w) 31 1 45 36 24 33 
Korneeva (KPRF) (i) 16 1 30 24 16 24 
Shershin (LDPR) 5 .2 9 12 3 5 
Tabolin (Yabloko) 4 0 6 3 1 3 
Dmitriev (SPS) 2 1 10 4 2 3 
Potapov (VR-ES) 2 0 1 1 .4 1 
Sidorov (Rus) 1 0 1 1 .3 1 
       
INDEPENDENTS       
Krasnodar       
Yaryshev 14 3 46 34 25 18 
Zatsepina 9 1 35 19 29 14 
Kovaliuk 8 2 42 24 27 14 
Vysochin 5 .1 4 5 3 1 
Beloglazov 2 .1 4 4 3 1 
Savchenko 1 .1 3 1 2 1 
Sergeeva 1 .1 1 1 .3 .1 
Riazan’       
Trubitsyn 11 .5 27 35 9 13 
Milekhin 4 .4 12 15 9 11 
Mikhailov 2 .1 3 2 3 2 
Viktorov 2 .1 2 1 1 1 
Kprf 2 .1 1 1 1 2 
(i) = incumbent 
(w) = winner 
 
 
If partisans do appear to have an advantage in voters’ eyes for producing outputs but do 
                                                 
21
 The figures in this table need double-checking. They are calculated from questions 98, 100, 103, 113, 117, Okrug 
survey. 
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not appear to be dramatically more effective at contacting the district electorate, are parties 
lending significant reputational support to individual candidates? The concept of reputation is 
multifaceted, but for the purposes of this paper the focus is on the following question: Do any 
strong partisan attachments voters might have seem to be transferring to partisan candidates, 
generating forms of identification that cannot also be produced and mobilized by independents 
without the help of party nomination? Many survey instruments used to study party identification 
essentially rule out a negative answer by wording the research question in such a way that it 
could not reasonably apply to individual candidates. This paper thus relies on a measure 
developed by Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), based on social psychological studies of 
group identification, in their comparative study of partisanship. They ask voters how strongly 
they agree or disagree with the following statement: “When someone criticizes [party X], it feels 
like a personal insult” (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002, 37). We thus insert “candidate X” 
in place of “party X” and thereby gain some insight into the degree to which people come to 
identify with the candidates they vote for. If party identifications exist and rub off on candidates, 
and if this truly represents an advantage of party affiliation for candidates relative to 
nonpartisanship, we would expect ceteris paribus that voters should display greater levels of 
attachment to partisan than independent candidates (even if the overall level of attachment to 
candidates is low). Since we assume that such attachments are meaningful to candidates only if 
they generate a vote, we only ask voters about the particular candidate they voted for.  
Table 7 shows that in both Riazan’ and Krasnodar, there are significant numbers of voters 
who display signs of strong personal attachment to their candidates. Slightly over 10 percent in 
each district strongly agree that they feel personally insulted when their candidate is criticized, 
while roughly 30 percent more in each case “more or less” agree. 
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Table 7. Percentage of Self-Reported Voters Agreeing/Disagreeing to the Statement that 









Hard to say 
Krasnodar 14 27 40 9 10 
Riazan’ 12 31 22 7 25 
 
We break these responses down by individual candidates in Table 8, which like Table 6 
groups candidates according to region and whether or not they are party-nominated and which 
also orders candidates in the four resulting categories according to the share of the vote they won 
according to the official election results. Candidates who garnered less than 4 percent of the vote 
(rounded up) are dropped from the table since too few of their self-professed voters appeared in 
our survey to generate meaningful results for this part of the analysis. The results presented here 
do suggest that at least some parties may indeed be producing such an effect. The findings for the 
Communist Party’s candidates are the most suggestive: Between a fifth and a quarter of those 
who voted for the KPRF candidates (Shirshov in Krasnodar and Korneeva in Riazan’) appear to 
feel the most intense sense of attachment to their candidates, strongly agreeing that they feel 
personally insulted when their candidate is criticized. This is far greater than the share of any of 
the independents’ voters who profess such bonds, and this is true even for independents who 
ultimately won more votes than did the KPRF candidates--thus intensity of feeling does not 
appear to be merely a function of more general electoral appeal. The fact that precisely the 
Communist Party has such effects is just what theories of party development would expect since 
the KPRF has had the most time to cultivate such attachments. From this perspective, it is also 
unsurprising that the LDPR’s candidate in Riazan’, Shershin, also generated strong 
psychological connections with his voters: The LDPR joins the Communists as being one of the 
only two parties to win fractions in the Duma through the PR competition in every general Duma 
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election, thereby giving it the capacity to lend such appeal to candidates.
22
  
These results remain only suggestive pending further testing, especially because there 
appears to be no consistent significant difference between independent-candidate voters and 
party-candidate voters in terms of lesser attachments. Nevertheless, there do appear to be 
grounds for concluding that parties at least have the potential to generate voter loyalties to 
candidates over time in greater measure than even strong independents can elicit on their own. 
Finally, we consider whether party candidates are consistently viewed by voters as being 
more competent to handle important particular issues than are independent candidates. Table 9 
reports the percentages of our survey respondents who identified a given candidate as being 
likely “do the best job” in providing social guarantees, improving the regional economy, or 
combating crime and corruption. As with previous tables, candidates are listed by district, 
relationship to parties, and in the order of the vote they ultimately received. Respondents were 
also given the option of responding that there was no significant difference among candidates on 
these issues. As the table makes clear, the overwhelming majority of voters opted for the latter 
choice or were not able to venture an answer. The only candidates to stand out as being 
exceptionally competent on multiple issues are the two winners, Shishkarev in Riazan’ and 
Bulaev in Riazan’. The independent Yaryshev in Krasnodar appears to have had a bit more 
  
                                                 
22
 This will require further investigation, however, since other findings from the RES surveys suggest that the 
LDPR’s electorate has been highly unstable since 1995 despite its relatively consistently strong results in party-list 
elections. See Colton and Hale 2005. 
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Table 8. Percentage of Self-Reported Voters for Each Candidate Who Agree/Disagree with 













PARTISANS       
Krasnodar       
Shishkarev (Rodina) 19 12 33 39 8 8 
Kochian (UR) 11 15 17 42 12 10 
Shirshov (KPRF) 8 25 19 31 12 14 
Riazan’       
Bulaev (ER) 31 10 33 25 6 22 
Korneeva (KPRF) 16 21 31 18 8 20 
Shershin (LDPR) 5 28 16 9 6 38 
Tabolin (Yabloko) 4 0 26 26 11 37 
       
INDEPENDENTS       
Krasnodar        
Yaryshev 14 16 20 45 6 14 
Zatsepina 9 12 33 37 14 4 
Kovaliuk 8 12 16 51 6 16 
Vysochin 5 6 50 28 17 0 
Riazan’       
Trubitsyn 11 6 32 14 8 36 
Milekhin 4 7 7 36 0 50 
 
 
credibility on crime and corruption than most other candidates, but he still trailed Shishkarev, if 
only by a hair. One possible interpretation in light of aforementioned findings is the following: 
Most voters simply don’t think that their district representatives really have the power to impact 
such big issues and instead many want them to focus on small things that they can achieve, such 
as providing constituency services. Indeed, as was noted above, the latter is where a plurality of 
our districts’ voters wanted their parliamentary representatives to place their priority.  
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Table 9. The Percentage of Respondents Identifying a Candidate as Likely to Do the Best 
Job on Key Issues
23
  




PARTISANS    
Krasnodar    
Shishkarev (Rodina) (i)(w) 13 13 7 
Kochian (UR) 2 2 2 
Shirshov (KPRF) 4 3 3 
Belichenko (LDPR) .1 1 1 
Panchenko (Yabloko) .2 .2 .3 
Kuznetsov (PVR/RPZh) 0 0 .1 
Gerasimov (Rus) 0 .2 0 
Riazan’    
Bulaev (ER) (w) 16 15 13 
Korneeva (KPRF) (i) 5 3 2 
Shershin (LDPR) 2 2 2 
Tabolin (Yabloko) .4 .2 .4 
Dmitriev (SPS) .1 .1 .1 
Potapov (VR-ES) 0 0 .2 
Sidorov (Rus) 0 0 .2 
    
INDEPENDENTS    
Krasnodar    
Yaryshev 3 2 6 
Zatsepina 3 1 2 
Kovaliuk 3 3 3 
Vysochin 1 1 .4 
Beloglazov .1 .1 0 
Savchenko 0 0 .4 
Sergeeva 0 0 0 
Riazan’    
Trubitsyn 2 2 1 
Milekhin 1 1 1 
Mikhailov 1 .3 .3 
Viktorov .1 .2 .4 
Kprf .1 .1 .1 
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 Questions 124, 125, 126, Okrugs survey. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has sought to demonstrate that survey research combined with a focused 
subnational comparative case study in Russia can shed significant light on a major question of 
politics: Why precisely do virtually all democracies feature party systems instead of being 
dominated by independents or politicians linked primarily to nonparty forms of organization? 
The results presented here are perhaps the first to explicitly test in a direct way the most 
prominent argument, which is that parties predominate because they provide organization, 
branding, or outputs that are useful for candidates for office better than do nonparty forms. The 
findings from the paired comparison of districts in Krasnodar and Riazan’, while only a first cut, 
do indicate that parties were able to provide something significant to their candidates. This 
resonates with earlier findings by studies of Russian parties suggesting that parties have been 
able to generate significant connections with sizable shares of voters (e.g., Colton 2000; Miller et 
al. 2000). 
But crucially, this study also found that candidates in post-Soviet Russia are capable of 
connecting effectively with voters independently of parties. While the victors in our two districts 
were both party nominees, the nonpartisans did nearly as well as the top party-nominated 
candidates in contacting potential voters, generating personal attachments on the part of voters, 
and communicating a sense of competence to handle important issues. Of course, this was not 
always saying much: No candidate stood out in a large number of potential voters’ minds as 
being best able to deal with the key problems of the regional economy, crime and corruption, and 
social welfare. But sometimes it was to say a lot. The leading candidates were fairly effective in 
finding ways to reach voters, and the top independents were indeed able to reach over a third of 
voters in their districts in such a way that the voters remembered this afterwards. This speaks to 
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the fact that “independents” were not really independent in any pure sense. Instead, as Hale 
(2006) has pointed out in other elections, the strongest nonpartisans often had the backing of 
important “party substitutes” such as local political machines or major corporate conglomerates 
with strong local presence on the ground that tended to operate independently of parties. Our 
district reports make clear that the strongest independents did have such support: Yaryshev from 
the Krasnodar regional political machine, Zatsepina from the remains of a partially displaced 
political machine (local branches of Krasnodar’s Otechestvo party) and business structures, 
Vysochin in the Tuapsinsk territorial administration, Kovaliuk from Novorossiisk city business, 
and Trubitsyn from his major corporate network in a big part of the city of Riazan’. These 
structures were able to give independent candidates much of the support that other candidates 
could hope to gain from parties, even the strongest parties in our two regions. 
The study does provide at least some indication that Hypothesis 1 might be right, that 
parties may have the potential to give candidates an edge, even in Russia’s highly complex 
political environment of the 1990s and early 2000s where candidates also had various party 
substitutes to turn to. For one thing, in both districts, more voters tended to believe that deputies 
are more productive in party fractions than to believe independents generate better results. 
Additionally, the two parties with the longest official tenure in the Duma (the KPRF and LDPR) 
also appeared to be taken close to heart by larger shares of their voters. This personal attachment, 
which did appear to transfer from party to candidate in a limited fashion, at least potentially 
means that party candidates can hope for a more solid electorate, one that will turn out in foul 
weather and stick with that candidate for multiple election cycles to a degree greater than 
nonparty candidates are likely to experience.  
What stands out overall, however, is that any partisan advantage appears to be quite 
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weak, at least in these two districts. What this tells us is that there are at least some political 
contexts in which parties, while not insignificant, do not generate a big enough advantage to 
induce candidates to steadily come to see them as their only feasible option for winning and 
retaining office. And this calls into question Hypothesis 2, meaning that we may best look for 
reasons other than parties’ inherent advantages for candidates when we are looking to explain 
why party systems emerge and generally dominate democracies. There would strongly seem to 
appear to be other factors at work, such as the role of the state in driving, stifling, or distorting 
party system development as a conscious strategy of rule (Hale 2006; Slater 2010). We also 
cannot rule out that parties’ advantages are far weaker in highly de-ideologized contexts (Hanson 
2010). This might support a further supposition that parties’ failure to dominate other political 
forms has had a lot to do with Russia’s steady slide away from rather than toward democratic 
ideals since at least the mid-1990s. Thus while some might argue that Russia’s non-democratic 
status makes it inappropriate as a case in the study of party system development, one might argue 
that this is precisely why it should be studied, because its slide toward authoritarianism is in fact 
a symptom of problems with its party system. Indeed, the present study also finds that the 
significant difference in the degrees of democracy in Krasnodar and Riazan’ did not make much 
of a difference in the patterns of party and nonparty performance examined here, suggesting that 
we are in fact observing a pattern of only low-level party advantage that does not hinge crucially 
on how authoritarian the context is. Of course, further research must subject these tentative 
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